Failure to reach a deal with Khan is not an option for Pakistan's Establishment
Given the economic and security situation in the country, the establishment needs to achieve a breakthrough with Khan in the near future.
In negotiations, it is vital for all parties involved to understand their BATNA, which stands for the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. In simple words, this is what a party involved in a negotiation would do if they cannot reach an agreement.
Imagine that you took an expensive suit to a dry cleaner, who subsequently lost it. You are upset and want compensation, but the dry cleaner obviously is playing hardball with you.
In this situation, you could take what the business is offering you as compensation, perhaps a store credit and get on with life. However, if you choose not to reach an agreement on the amount of the credit, one option you have is to take the business to court - an expensive, time-consuming process even in the friendliest jurisdictions. Alternatively, you could leave a terrible review for the business, tell your friends and family to never go there, and hope that this impacts the dry-cleaner’s bottom line more than the value of the suit that they could have compensated you for.
In short, you do not have a lot of great options, and therefore it would be best to take the store credit and move on with life.
How does BATNA relate to the ongoing political game of thrones in Pakistan?
Just as the dry-cleaner and customer must weigh their alternatives, so too must political actors in Pakistan's high-stakes negotiations.
There are three key actors involved in the ongoing saga in Pakistan: the Pakistani establishment, which reflects the will of Army Chief General Asim Munir; the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which reflects the will of former prime minister Imran Khan; and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), whose government is led by Shehbaz Sharif but broadly the party reflects the will of Nawaz Sharif.
These three actors have been engaged in a confrontation for a long time, with:
the establishment viewing Khan and his PTI as a major threat given the events of May 9th.
Khan and the PTI believing that an election was stolen from them in February 2024.
the Sharifs and the PML-N believing that the establishment first used the PTI to steal an election in 2018 from them and subsequently has soured on the PTI and therefore needs to cut Khan and his party down to size.
In recent weeks, these actors have entered negotiations, with the formal and public process being facilitated by Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the current Speaker of the National Assembly. At the same time, a backchannel is also operational, with PTI’s chairman recently confirming that he and the chief minister of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa did recently meet the army chief.
Amidst all this, Khan has been sentenced to 14 years in jail, and his wife Bushra Bibi to seven years in a corruption case.
Which led me to think about what the BATNA for each party is to better think through how this process may play out. And long story short, the alternative is not great for the Pakistani establishment and General Munir.
The PTI can continue to go back to agitating and confronting the status quo.
Over the years, Khan has shown that he is perfectly capable of playing things out in jail and dominate the news cycle as and when he wants. His party has also shown a remarkable capability to keep its opponents off balance, utilizing social media and international advocacy to extremely effective ends. And while protests and overt confrontation has not really worked for the party, the fact is that it remains the most popular political force in the country, with the legend of Khan growing every day he battles it out in jail.
As a result, should the talks fail, Khan can go back to doing what he and his party have been doing since 2022, ensuring that Pakistan’s political economy remains hostage to the PTI.
The PML-N can reap the benefits of being in government, for as long as the establishment has no other options.
Given the dearth of options in Islamabad and Punjab, the PML-N remains largely comfortable in terms of benefiting from the status quo. Nawaz’s daughter Maryam is running Punjab from Lahore as she sees fit, gaining vital experience in governance and leveraging the provincial government’s patronage network to build allies. In Islamabad, Shehbaz Sharif has given the establishment what it desires and then some more, but his cabinet has also effectively managed the economy and brought about much-needed stability through the IMF program.
With inflation and interest rates both coming down, the PML-N finally is expecting some breathing room, which means that the 2025-26 budget could allow the party to prime the economic pump and reap, what it believes, would be political gains. As a result, it can go back to doing what it is currently doing if the negotiations fail.
The establishment, however, needs greater room to maneuver given its security and economic priorities.
The rapidly escalating tensions with Afghanistan and the worsening security situation on both sides of the Durand Line has put the establishment in a bind. A higher tempo of military operations requires support across Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s society, where the PTI is currently dominant. As a result, it is an uphill task for the establishment to do what it wants from a security perspective while the PTI and Khan remain engaged in a standoff against General Munir.
In addition, economic reforms that create greater financial space for the country - and by extension for the military’s own securing financing needs - require a calming of tensions on the political front. This cannot happen so long as Khan and the PTI have not been offered a way out from the current bind that they find themselves in.
Finally, the incoming Trump administration and the PTI’s inroads on both sides of the political aisle in Washington is most certainly a cause for concern. A tweet or a statement by Trump or his administration can insert further volatility, whereas co-opting the PTI’s US machinery offers an opportunity to explore a better relationship between Pakistan and the Trump administration.
As a result, it is the establishment which needs these talks to proceed for the time being, because going back to an overt confrontation is simply not conducive to achieving its near-term objectives.
Things, however, can always change rapidly in Pakistan.
This is a time-bound analysis, and in negotiations it is also important to for all actors to know when they should cash in their chips. As such, it is important to recognize that while the establishment has a need to achieve a breakthrough with the PTI, this window of opportunity for Khan could also close if he pushes for too much gain.
Khan's demand for an immediate transfer of the people's mandate to the PTI is unrealistic for the establishment to concede currently. As a result, the best that Munir and the establishment can offer Khan and his party is some relief for the time being, which includes a wrap-up of ongoing cases against him and his party workers.
In addition, Khan could also seek greater political space in the heavily controlled and censored political economy of Pakistan, while agreeing to work with the establishment on cooling temperatures and collaborating with Munir on key matters of national security.
This could lead to good behavior on all sides, with the PML-N being able to compete with the PTI on service delivery, while the PTI plays the role of a popular opposition, and the establishment eases up the pressure on Khan and his workers.
For the time being, it is the establishment that needs a breakthrough, and so the ball is in its court in terms of finding a path that credibly signals to Khan that the establishment means business.